The world leaders are in a no-win situation with Iranian nuclear developments. Recent news has a second nuclear enrichment plant discovered near Qom. In addition, Iran has done a saber-rattling display of weaponry, including a Shahab-3 rocket capable of reaching most of the Middle East, including Israel.
The “P5 plus 1” of the five permanent (and veto-wielding) members of the UN Security Council (US, UK, France, China and Russia) along with Germany have trying to use a carrot-and-stick approach, offering peaceful nuclear technology to Iran in return for backing away from any nuclear weapon ambitions. However, Iran doesn’t seem to like their carrots.
Iran is not part of the G20 bloc of economic powers that are replacing the smaller G8 as the main international economic policy grouping. However, if they had a G25 rather than a G20, Iran would be a candidate for inclusion; they’re the fourth leading oil producer behind the Saudis, Russia and the US, according to the U.S. Energy Information Administration.
That makes them more independent and more part of the world economy than the other major nuclear renegade, North Korea, whose two main cash exports are weapons and blackmail. North Korea has been open to economic quid-pro-quos, getting energy and food aid in return for being a nice world citizen for a time; the problem with Dear Leader is that he doesn’t stick with his deals for long.
The stick of minor UN sanctions has not made a dent in Iran’s nuclear ambitions. Getting stronger sanction through the UN have been problematic to date, since France and Russia are major trading partners of Iran; they have tended to let international trade get ahead of world security, especially since they would be minor demons in Iran’s eyes compared to the greater Satans US and Israel and thus less likely to be on the receiving end of an Iranian nuke.
One drawback to serious sanctions that would include blocking oil sales is that Iran only has to find a few players willing to ignore sanctions to get a market for its oil. Iraq managed to function nicely under UN sanctions during the Saddam era, as they could always find buyers for contraband oil. Thus, importation of refined products (Iran is short on refineries) is on the US’ wish list of sanctions.
The other possibility is that Iran might not fight the sanctions and take its oil off the world market. With Iranian oil off the market, oil prices would head back up to their 2008 levels and bring $4/gallon gas back, if not even higher. That would put the world economy back into a recession worse that the one we’re bottoming out from at present. Withholding oil can be a wicked weapon at Iran’s disposal, doing almost as much damage as a few nukes would.
That will make sanctions hard to use, as Iran can inflict more economic damage on the world than the world can inflict on it. In addition, the placement of the second enrichment plant makes a military attack problematic.
The second enrichment plant is in Qom, Iran’s spiritual center where the leading ayatollahs hold court. That would make the heavy bombardment needed to take out a nuclear plant in a military strike problematic, as collateral damage might include some clerics and holy sites. Even if an attack on the plant has no collateral damage, fellow Shiites in Iraq would not take kindly to the concept, creating psychological collateral damage.
That leaves accepting Iran as a nuclear power, much as India and Israel have managed to do, as the very uneasy path of least resistance.Iran: No Good Policy Options
The world leaders are in a no-win situation with Iranian nuclear developments. Recent news has a second nuclear enrichment plant discovered near Qom. In addition, Iran has done a saber-rattling display of weaponry, including a Shahab-3 rocket capable of reaching most of the Middle East, including Israel.
The “P5 plus 1” of the five permanent (and veto-wielding) members of the UN Security Council (US, UK, France, China and Russia) along with Germany have trying to use a carrot-and-stick approach, offering peaceful nuclear technology to Iran in return for backing away from any nuclear weapon ambitions. However, Iran doesn’t seem to like their carrots.
Iran is not part of the G20 bloc of economic powers that are replacing the smaller G8 as the main international economic policy grouping. However, if they had a G25 rather than a G20, Iran would be a candidate for inclusion; they’re the fourth leading oil producer behind the Saudis, Russia and the US, according to the U.S. Energy Information Administration.
That makes them more independent and more part of the world economy than the other major nuclear renegade, North Korea, whose two main cash exports are weapons and blackmail. North Korea has been open to economic quid-pro-quos, getting energy and food aid in return for being a nice world citizen for a time; the problem with Dear Leader is that he doesn’t stick with his deals for long.
The stick of minor UN sanctions has not made a dent in Iran’s nuclear ambitions. Getting stronger sanction through the UN have been problematic to date, since France and Russia are major trading partners of Iran; they have tended to let international trade get ahead of world security, especially since they would be minor demons in Iran’s eyes compared to the greater Satans US and Israel and thus less likely to be on the receiving end of an Iranian nuke.
One drawback to serious sanctions that would include blocking oil sales is that Iran only has to find a few players willing to ignore sanctions to get a market for its oil. Iraq managed to function nicely under UN sanctions during the Saddam era, as they could always find buyers for contraband oil. Thus, importation of refined products (Iran is short on refineries) is on the US’ wish list of sanctions.
The other possibility is that Iran might not fight the sanctions and take its oil off the world market. With Iranian oil off the market, oil prices would head back up to their 2008 levels and bring $4/gallon gas back, if not even higher. That would put the world economy back into a recession worse that the one we’re bottoming out from at present. Withholding oil can be a wicked weapon at Iran’s disposal, doing almost as much damage as a few nukes would.
That will make sanctions hard to use, as Iran can inflict more economic damage on the world than the world can inflict on it. In addition, the placement of the second enrichment plant makes a military attack problematic.
The second enrichment plant is in Qom, Iran’s spiritual center where the leading ayatollahs hold court. That would make the heavy bombardment needed to take out a nuclear plant in a military strike problematic, as collateral damage might include some clerics and holy sites. Even if an attack on the plant has no collateral damage, fellow Shiites in Iraq would not take kindly to the concept, creating psychological collateral damage.
That leaves accepting Iran as a nuclear power, much as India and Israel have managed to do, as the very uneasy path of least resistance.